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The paper attempts to challenge the somewhat marginal role of international factors in 
the study of transitions to democracy. Theoretical and practical difficulties in proving 
causal mechanisms between international variables and domestic outcomes can be 
overcome by defining the international dimension in terms of Western dominance of 
world politics and by identifying Western actions towards democratising countries. 
The paper focuses on the case of Algeria, where international factors are key in 
explaining the initial process of democratisation and its following demise. In 
particular, the paper argues that direct Western policies, the pressures of the 
international system and external shocks influence the internal distribution of power 
and resources, which underpins the different strategies of all domestic actors. The 
paper concludes that analysis based purely on domestic factors cannot explain the 
process of democratisation and that international variables must be taken into more 
serious account and much more detailed.  
 
Introduction 
In recent years, the literature on transitions to democracy has begun to analyse 
in more detail the international context of regime change. This aspect had been 
labelled ‘the forgotten dimension’1 due to theoretical shortcomings and practical 
difficulties in gathering evidence, but it is now recognised that international factors 
are an important component of transitions to democracy. For instance, in his analysis 
of transitions in Eastern Europe, Sakwa argues that ‘democratisation in the region is 
to a large degree a function of international processes and is far from being solely an 
endogenous process.’2 Nevertheless, explanations focusing on domestic factors and 
processes still dominate the literature.  
The purpose of this paper is to introduce systematically international factors in 
the analysis of transitions by utilising the experience of Algeria in the late eighties 
and early nineties. These international factors include both 'systemic pressures' and 
specific policy actions that Western liberal democracies undertake. Western powers 
play a double role in this respect. On the one hand, they are often decisive in 
encouraging and sustaining democratisation since they all clearly set out the 
promotion of democracy abroad as one of their main foreign policy objectives. On the 
other hand, they contribute to crushing transitions when the outcome cannot be 
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controlled and challenges the stability upon which they rely to extract benefits and 
resources from the international system. The impact of the international context is 
particularly strong in regional settings where profound economic, social, political and 
cultural differences exist; the Mediterranean basin is certainly such a region. In this 
area the perception of threats is greater and the fear of radical transformation is often 
unwelcome. The paper thus argues that the international dimension was at least partly 
responsible for the initiation of the democratic process and for its demise by the 
Algerian military. 
At the same time, the paper attempts to offer an innovative analysis of the 
failure of the Algerian transition. The justification for the choice of case study lays in 
the need to explore the origins of the process of democratisation and its subsequent 
demise. There are studies of how the international community reacted to the 
intervention of the military,3 studies on how the international community could help 
solving the political conflict,4 examinations of France’s position towards the parties in 
conflict5, and works on how domestic parties attempted to influence the perceptions 
of external agents6, but there is the need for a careful and systematic examination of 
past events to provide a solid understanding of how domestic actors were influenced 
by and perceived their external environment. The theoretical framework and the 
questions arising from the case study inform each other and their dynamic 
relationship seems to point to the centrality of the international dimension of 
democratisation.   
 
The international dimension 
The relevance of the international context is evident in the events occurred in 
Eastern Europe and Central America and it is beyond doubt that major shifts in the 
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distribution of power in the international system and global political and economic 
trends contributed to a number of democratisations.7 In his work, Samuel Huntington 
pointed out that the democratisations of the third wave have been the product of 
international economic and political triggers, but fails to follow up on that point and 
reverts back to explaining the transitional processes through domestic variables.8 
Some of these international triggers such as changes in the international economy, the 
difficulties of socialism and the increased legitimacy of the discourse of human rights 
can be seen at work in Algeria as well.  
Laurence Whithead attempted to capture and systematise the international 
dimensions of democratisation and his categories of 'contagion', 'control' and 'consent' 
are very useful tools of analysis, but his framework should be expanded on and 
detailed.9 Others built on that study and attempted to account for international factors 
in their comparative overviews of transitions, but found theoretical and practical 
obstacles. Despite these impediments, the issues related to the effect of the 
international context must be analysed more closely. In a global system of 
interdependent political and economic relations, international variables can play a key 
role in determining the domestic structure of countries in transition. International 
factors cannot simply be considered as a secondary and indirect source of influence. 
They have a direct impact on all aspects of democratisation, from its initiation to its 
consolidation or from its early difficulties to its demise. There is agreement in the 
literature concerning the autonomy of domestic political forces10 and the subsequent 
peripheral role assigned to international factors, for instance the so-called facilitating 
argument. This stems more from the difficulties of establishing clear-cut causal 
mechanisms between international variables and outcomes of democratisation rather 
than from theoretical assumptions or definitional difficulties.  
The Failed Liberalisation of Algeria 
 5 
When it comes to discuss the changes taking place in Algeria at the turn of the 
eighties, it is just as important to focus on the international dimension as it is on the 
domestic factors. There are three specific issues that should be tackled: 1) issues of 
access of international actors to domestic actors and how this access is used to 
promote foreign policy goals that change the costs/benefits calculation of 
action/inaction of these domestic actors; 2) issues of indirect pressures from the 
international system itself such as the necessity to adopt a specific form of regime in 
order to be included in the international community or to fulfil a pre-determined role 
in the world-system. and 3) external shocks that affect the strategies of the players.  
The role of Western countries is constantly underplayed, even though they 
have considerable power in shaping international affairs thanks to a combination of 
economic and military might, domination of international organisations, and political 
influence. Powerful countries have a much greater impact than what is generally 
conceded. Thus, in its most extreme form, the study of transitions could be entirely 
reversed and it could be argued that a structural approach would put international 
pressure at the core of the analysis on democratisation as it 'forces' specific domestic 
choices by setting an agenda of feasible options constrained by the interests of the 
dominating states. It could then be argued that decisions or outcomes seemingly 
deriving from autonomous domestic choices or factors are in reality the product of 
'invisible' but strong external pressures that determine the timing and the structure of 
democratisation or, eventually, its demise and failure. Admittedly, this argument 
would fail to capture the complexities of reality, the diverse degrees and timing of the 
external pressure exercised, and the complicated interaction between domestic factors 
and 'foreign' forces. A multi-causal explanation would allow escaping from the 
rigidity and improbability of monocausality and, at the same time, to look for 'degrees' 
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of influence that should be assigned to the different factors at play.  The centrality of 
the international context is reinforced during the consolidation period. In fact, the role 
of international factors is not solely limited to the 'initiating' aspect of 
democratisation, but can also account for the failure of new democracies to 
consolidate. It is often stressed that the West plays a key role in promoting democracy 
and that liberal economics encourages countries to be more open and more 
'penetration-prone' to the ideas and the institutions of democracy. While penetration 
proved beneficial in a number of cases (Spain, Portugal, Greece among others) and 
Western support for democratising efforts increased in the last decade, this facilitating 
role is 'conditional'.  
The national interests of the most powerful countries shape the international 
political climate and the socio-economic structure of the international system. 
Countries embracing democracy and its institutions have thus to conform to a 
preconceived form of democratic structure based on the experience and the needs of 
Western liberal-democracies. Moreover, they have to take into consideration their 
prospects of integration in the international economic system with all the constraints 
that derive from it. If the West shapes the international system according to its 
interests, it follows that those who will conform will be rewarded and those who do 
not will be punished. Democracy and democratisation then become foreign policy 
tools utilised to pursue interests. It is so much so that ‘the noble concept, 'democracy', 
has become, along with universal suffrage, just another rhetorical device.’11 Western 
liberal-democracy is deemed to be working when its institutions, properly 
transplanted in a democratising country, lead to the outcomes expected in the West. 
These outcomes consist of political stability, free-market economic reforms, some 
sort of allegiance to Western ideals, and loose respect for basic democratic procedures 
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and liberal rights. When instead the outcome of the transition is likely to lead in 
directions opposed by the West, pressure is exercised to force a change. This pressure 
may or may not lead to the desired outcome, but it is designed to obtain results. 
Achieving stability and security is then the primary objective and this is obtained with 
the help of domestic forces afraid to lose out from the regime change and that, once in 
control, will be a more reliable interlocutor for the West. For instance in the Algeria 
case, where Franco-Algerian relationships are ‘far from being traditional political 
relations between nation-states, but are about economic co-operation and political 
networking.’12, the replacement of the elites in power would have led to a problematic 
re-negotiation of these links. Thus 'democracy' is a concept that can be bent to fit 
Western interests and international patterns of political and economic development. 
Algeria might just be another country in the line of 'undesirable' democracies that 
disturbed the smooth running of the liberal international order. It is hotly debated 
whether Algeria's democratisation was a ‘true’ one, but it seems that if the definition 
of procedural democracy is adopted, the Algerian transition fulfils the criteria. 
Transitions are understood mainly in terms of regime change towards a Western-style 
liberal democracy with a strong emphasis on procedural aspects. Despite difficulties 
and obstacles, Algeria was labouring its way to adopt and work within such a system. 
International variables should obviously not obscure the role and interests of 
internal actors. In particular, the distribution of power and resources among domestic 
actors together with their objectives is relevant to the entire process and should not be 
relegated to a marginal role. However, it should be underlined that the very 
distribution of resources within the domestic sphere is influenced by outside pressure 
that can determine who will be the beneficiary of specific resources provided by 
external actors or generated by systemic forces. The Algerian case offers, among 
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others, the issue of military intervention in a democratic election. It is accepted that 
the decision to intervene was a purely internal affair, but the costs of intervention may 
have been lowered or increased by previous knowledge of the international reactions 
to it. If the international environment is perceived to be supportive of the intervention, 
the costs of carrying it out largely diminish. The external element becomes a relevant 
factor in the decision-making process. Established liberal democracies have an 
interest in promoting democracy around the world and they are seen as potential 
facilitators because they can exercise a considerable amount of pressure against 
recalcitrant authoritarian rulers. Unfortunately, such a strategy of rightful 'promotion' 
is undermined by the lack of a standardised conceptualisation and application of 
democratic principles. Western policies concerning the promotion and defence of 
democratic principles and values are flawed because they are adapted to national 
interests. Democratic principles are sometimes in conflict with much more 
compelling interests (security, gaining access to markets and resources, protecting 
investments) and the resulting overall foreign policy is the product of these 'internal 
struggles' among competing interests.13 From this, it follows that the lack of ‘a clear 
and consistent standard of what democracy entails on the part of countries seeking to 
nurture democracy’14 undermines Western credibility, democracy's appeal, and 
ultimately favours authoritarian rulers who will search for democratic legitimisation 
to please international institutions and foreign investors, without really allowing for a 
meaningful opening of the political space. 
If this theoretical structure of transition concerning the international context 
holds, the analysis of this complex phenomenon will be easier. Differences between 
countries who succeeded and those who did not could then probably be connected to 
'international variables'. The utilisation of such theoretical framework for countries on 
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the Southern bank of the Mediterranean could lead to understand the reasons why 
effective democratic rule is not a feature of North African political systems.  
 
The case of Algeria 
In Algeria, external factors impacted, at varying degrees, on the initiation, 
development and failure of the transition. The influence of two different 'international 
effects' and their convergence with the interests of key domestic actors led first to a 
process of extensive liberalisation and then to the dismantling of the democratic 
process through a military intervention. These three effects are: a) 'systemic 
pressures', which force countries in the process of democratising to conform to 
specific political and economic requirements in order to fit in a West-dominated 
system, b) 'ad hoc policies' adopted by France, the United States and, to a lesser 
extent, other European countries aimed at influencing the distribution of power 
among internal actors in order to arrive at their most preferred outcome; and 3) 
external shocks and events that conditioned the domestic bargaining game, changed 
the structure of incentives and modified the strategies of the different actors. 
The relevance of the international dimension should not obscure the existence 
of different explanations that have been offered for the failed democratisation of 
Algeria. Specifically: a) the inherent incompatibility between Islamic culture and 
democracy15; b) the interests of key domestic actors, particularly the Army, in going 
forward with democratisation and then changing the course of the process16; and c) 
the failure of economic liberal reforms. The first explanation is certainly powerful, 
but it can be countered by arguing that any 'culture' is able to develop a democratic 
spirit and lead to the installation of democratic institutions. For instance, there are a 
number of schools of thought within the Islamic world that do not see any 
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incompatibility between Islam and democracy and actually call on the current 
generation of Muslim leaders to implement democratic reforms.17 It could be argued 
that, in fact, any serious attempt to democratise a country where Islam is the dominant 
religion failed not so much because Islam is incapable of dealing with democratic 
principles per se, but for the opposition of the governing elites which found very 
comfortable the idea of an inherent conflict between Islam and democracy in order to 
hold on to their privileges with the blessing of Western powers.  
The second explanation, focusing on actors and their rational strategic 
choices, is somewhat incomplete. While it is true that intra-elites power struggles and 
bargaining processes are key to any explanation, external agents and external 
developments affect the internal distribution of power and resources. Explanations 
focusing exclusively on the dealing among domestic actors run the risk of looking at 
the transition as if it was occurring in a political vacuum, in complete isolation from 
the international system. 
The belief that the transition failed due to the failure of liberal economic 
reforms does not capture the complexity of the reform process. The IMF-sponsored 
liberal economic reforms, far from sparking demands from a new class of 
businessmen for political change, had the opposite effect of allowing the regime to 
tighten the grip on society and derail change. Sections of civil society normally 
associated with demands for greater political liberalisation become in fact the main 
supporters of the continuation of the existing political order. The reforms of the mid-
1980s simply created a class of nouveaux riches, who enriched themselves thanks to 
their connection with powerful figures. Thus, ‘businessmen, instead of becoming 
vigorous proponents of free markets, end up as crony capitalists, making profits 
because of their connections to those in power.’18  
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The contribution of previous explanations suggests that we should not 
underestimate the role of domestic actors or the strategic choices or cultural and 
historical aspects peculiar to Algeria. There is nevertheless a strong argument for the 
possibility that external factors did influence the transition. Assuming that internal 
factors are all explaining would be pretentious and theoretically difficult to defend. 
The origin of Algerian transition is held to be the October 1988 riots. The 
harsh crackdown signified the beginning of the end for the ruling the Front de 
Liberation National (FLN). The riots were rooted in economic distress but were also a 
sign of a more profound malaise in Algerian society, which had been subjected for too 
long to authoritarian rule. Surprisingly, the regime responded to the crisis by opening 
up the political system and gave way ‘to a new era of pluralistic competition.’19  
President Chadli and the Army hoped that multi-party competition and 
freedom would lead to renewed legitimacy and their political survival. Thus, it would 
appear that the initiation of democracy and its demise could be simply understood in 
terms of domestic pressures and strategic choices of the principal actors.20 However, 
the October riots were not rooted only in the domestic sphere. First of all, economic 
hardships depended greatly on pressures deriving from the international economic 
system and were not only a consequence of mismanagement of resources and 
corruption. In particular, the price of oil and gas, on which Algeria relied to sustain its 
internal market and generous welfare state, had fallen sharply over the last few years 
‘from $ 13.5 billion in 1985 to $ 9.6 billion in 1986 and 1987.’21 The sharp drop in oil 
and gas revenues is the external shock that exposed the structural weakness of the 
Algerian economy and further undermined the fate of the market-oriented reforms of 
the previous years. The 1985 and 1986 counter-shocks were the trigger of the crisis, 
which the IMF-sponsored reforms aggravated. These reforms had been carried out by 
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a small group of economists within the Algerian government in collaboration with 
IMF officials, even though there was no formal agreement between the IMF and the 
Algerian government at the time. The pressure to conform to a new international 
economic order was on. These IMF-sponsored reforms and the drop in revenues had 
in turn dramatic consequences on the general well being of the population. 22  
On the political front, the socialist ideology was under intense criticism world-
wide thanks to the failings of the socialist bloc and the imminent Western victory in 
the Cold War led to a profound rethinking within the Algerian ruling elite. The pace 
of the political changes, initiated with the introduction of the new constitution in 
February 1989, accelerated in the following years. The collapse of the Soviet empire 
has been interpreted as a major ideological victory for Western liberal democracies 
with their emphasis on individual rights, formal democratic procedures and free 
market economy. In this rapidly changing international environment, where Western 
countries were both victorious and confident of their superior system of government, 
Algeria had to adapt its domestic political and economic institutions in order to 
survive and benefit from the changes that had taken place. The realisation that only 
Western recognition and support would be 'the only game in town' convinced the elite 
to become ‘liberal democrats’, but their credibility was very shaken by the 
opportunism they showed. On the contrary, the FIS played on its credibility and 
revolutionary purity to further its support. In this new competition for control, Chadli 
believed that democratic politics would turn the Algerians away from the FLN and 
steer them toward him. Chadli's calculations backfired when it became clear that the 
FIS had capitalised on the legitimacy's crisis of the regime. 
The democratisation process was at first welcomed and encouraged in the 
West. The Islamic Front was not yet considered a threat and the USA, traditionally 
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close to a number of radical Islamic movements, were not opposed to the FIS as a 
matter of principle like some of its European allies.23 Moreover, Western diplomats 
and observers expected that the new multi-party system would lead to the formation 
of a coalition government which would have resulted in political moderation, 
institution building, and the steady continuation of economic reforms. Chadli and the 
Army also probably expected power-sharing to be the outcome and this could explain 
why they did not take over power before January 1992. The June 1990 local elections 
had given a stunning victory to the FIS24, but Chadli was still hopeful that he could 
work out a deal to force the FIS into sharing government responsibilities. The 
electoral results however convinced the French and their European allies that the 
process of democratisation was favouring anti-Western forces.  
The Gulf War further affected the development of the transition. The Algerian 
government condemned the invasion of Kuwait, but worked immediately to avoid an 
internationalisation of the crisis that would likely lead to war and major divisions 
among Arab states.25 During the military operations themselves, the Algerian 
government progressively hardened its stance against the West, but failed to convince 
the population of its real opposition to the war by not taking any measure susceptible 
to interpretation in the West as pro-Saddam. This fine balancing act failed to work, as 
the Algerian population and opposition movements increasingly criticised western 
countries. What is very important for the Algerian transition is that the Gulf War 
‘considerably inflamed the passions within which Algerian politics took place’26 and 
was the external shock that began to destabilise a certain equilibrium and peaceful co-
existence that had been reached between the FIS and the elite in power. Both Leveau 
and Labat point out that the Gulf War unsettled the informal and unofficial pact of 
non-aggression between the FIS and the Chadli presidency and undermined the 
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possibility of a smooth transition by radicalising both sides.27 The Gulf War affected 
the strategies and perceptions of three key core actors in the transition.   
The leadership of the FIS was at first at odds on how to react to the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait and the Saudi response to it. The FIS had been receiving funds 
from Saudi Arabia to carry out its political and social activities and it was reluctant to 
fully support Saddam Hussein in his enterprise. However, given the popular mood, 
the FIS quickly found itself at the helm of street demonstrations that were clearly pro-
Saddam and anti-Western. The strong popular and spontaneous support for Saddam 
encouraged the FIS to be more adventurous and the leadership ‘canalised and 
exploited the urban masses’ dissatisfaction by ditching their previous prudent 
stance.’28 The FIS saw the Gulf War as a major boost to its position within an 
Algerian society that found itself deeply at odds with Western actions. FIS actions 
were not simply limited to mass demonstrations challenging the Algerian government 
to take radical actions against the West, but went as far as trying to send volunteers to 
fight with Saddam troops and to request officially that the government ‘stop exporting 
oil and gas to those countries involved in the aggression against Iraq.’29  
From the point of view of the government, the Gulf War presented the 
opportunity to play a relevant role in negotiating a solution that would see Algeria 
becoming again a central actor in international politics. Algeria was looking to 
reinvent itself in the New World Order after having abandoned its key role of 
mediator between the Eastern bloc and the movement of non-aligned countries. A 
peaceful outcome of the crisis obtained thanks to the efforts of the Algerian 
diplomacy would have increased the international prestige of the President and would 
have made Algeria a privileged interlocutor of the West with the Arab world. 
Unfortunately for the regime, this policy backfired. As previously underlined, the 
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population was largely pro-Saddam and the government tried to harden its stance 
against the US-led coalition, but was sidestepped by the much more radical FIS 
discourse. The government was caught between the need to be seen by the West as a 
reliable partner and the need to be seen as voicing the worries of the majority of the 
population. This dilemma was not solved and ‘the Gulf crisis revealed the cruel 
delegitimisation of the Chadli government, ended the political apathy of the 
population and marked the end of the government foreign policy aimed at reinserting 
Algeria in the international system.’30 The problems of the governing elite were 
compounded by the fact that, while trying to normalise relations with France, they 
were open of being accused to colluding with the 'enemy', as France had chosen to 
stand side by side the United States to the detriment of its privileged relations with 
North African countries.  
The Gulf War and the reactions it provoked in the Arab world began to 
dominate also the Western agenda. Concerning the situation in Algeria, the French 
government was finally convinced that the arrival to power of the Islamic Front would 
be detrimental to French interests and security. According to a presidential aid31, the 
French government had already tremendous reservations about the FIS, not so much 
for its dubious democratic commitment, but for the anti-France policies it might 
implement. The Gulf War dispelled eventual reservations. Before the outbreak of 
hostilities against Iraq, President Mitterrand was quite confident that relations with 
North African countries would not be affected by French participation in the war 
against Iraq.32 His conviction and confidence were quickly put to the test and the 
events of the following months seemed to confirm to many in France the dangers that 
the FIS would pose.33 In July 1991 the magazine Jeune Afrique published a detailed 
The Failed Liberalisation of Algeria 
 16 
article highlighting the French position on political developments in the Maghreb 
with the title 'Mitterrand against the Islamists'.34  
However, and more importantly, the Gulf War had the effect of changing 
American perceptions of its interests in Algeria. Changes in policy followed swiftly. 
The United States had traditionally had poor relations with their Algerian counterparts 
due to the commitment of Algeria to anti-imperialism and third-worldism. Moreover, 
Algeria had privileged military relations with the Soviet Union35 and this was not well 
perceived in Washington even if the US were an important commercial partner for 
Algeria. For these reasons, the United States did not share the French preoccupation 
about the FIS. The commitment of the FIS to liberal economics and the opportunities 
that American companies might exploit in the region placed the United States ahead 
of European countries given the strong anti-French sentiments within the FIS. In 
addition, the fear that Algeria might follow the path of revolutionary Iran drove the 
United States diplomacy to entertain relations with FIS representatives. American 
policy-makers were still haunted by the mistakes committed during the Carter 
administration when clinging to the Shah alienated them from the new revolutionary 
actors emerging on the Iranian scene. Given that the United States traditionally had 
good relations with some fundamentalist movements,36 US policy-makers believed 
that they could 'do business' with the FIS as well.  
For American diplomacy, ‘the only real preoccupation is the stability of Arab 
and Muslim countries and not the type of regime in charge, particularly if they are 
sitting on billions of cube metres of gas like Algeria.’37 This is, effectively, the 
bottom line of American policy-making in the region and the ambiguity towards the 
FIS present in American policies since the creation of that party disappeared during 
the Gulf War. The Gulf crisis showed to American policy makers that the FIS would 
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challenge the given international order and, more generally, ‘it reminded both the US 
and France the political and strategic importance of Algeria.’38 The FIS was poised to 
win the parliamentary elections to be held later in the year and Western governments, 
already worried about the future of their economic ties to Algeria, felt threatened. It 
follows that, even in times when the promotion of democracy was at the top of the 
foreign policy agenda in western countries, ‘the hostile attitude of the FIS during 
Desert Storm contributes to explaining the moderate reaction of the United States to 
the cancellation of the parliamentary elections in January 1992.’39  
Given that 'stability' is the true interest of the United States in the region, it 
follows that the exiting Bush administration did not sanction the military coup on the 
grounds that it had been carried out according to constitutional procedures. The Bush 
administration was severely criticised from members of the democratic opposition for 
its lack of resolve in condemning the cancellation of the elections and for its 
'inconsistencies' and double standards.40 The question was asked how could the 
President defend the institutions and procedures of democracy in Eastern Europe and 
Latin America, but not in Algeria. Ahmad Moussali goes even further and argues that 
‘Washington has also welcomed the Algerian government's iron-fist policies towards 
the Islamists and its suspension of the elections.’41 
After being postponed for a few months, the general elections were finally 
held in December 1991. The FIS won a landslide victory, but the Army carried out its 
coup. The international community was not displeased with the Army intervention. 
There are a number of intertwining interests and pressures that can account for the 
failure of Algeria to keep the course of democratisation. At the time of the 1990 local 
elections it was widely believed in European capitals that the rise to power of the 
Islamic Front in Algeria would have certainly posed serious concerns to the West in a 
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number of fields: military security, economic relations, migration, 'ideological 
confrontation', and stability in the Middle East. Given Algeria's position in the 
Mediterranean, NATO and France's southern flank could be exposed to a serious 
military threat even if the Algerian military had limited conventional capabilities. 
What concerned France and the NATO countries was in fact Algeria's nuclear 
program42. It was believed, or at least made believe, that Algeria was capable of 
acquiring nuclear capabilities and a nuclear bomb in the hands of an Islamic party was 
considered an unacceptable risk. Thus, an anti-Western government in power next to 
the borders of France, Italy and Spain could not have been welcomed.  
An Islamic government in Algeria could have had also a destabilising impact 
on Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt where there are active opposition Islamic groups. 
These might have been encouraged and supported by a democratically elected FIS-led 
government in Algeria, leading therefore to a South-South conflict scenario. As noted 
by Abed Charef, ‘both the Americans and the French were equally uneasy about the 
fate of their allies in the region, Tunisia and Morocco.’43 Heavily destabilised areas 
would have then surrounded Europe, with the contemporaneous breakout of chaos in 
the Balkans and in the Maghreb. International repercussions could have also been felt 
in the Middle East where the Israeli and Palestinians had just begun to work out a 
peace-agreement, to which the FIS was opposed. On the contrary, the Algerian 
military was more supportive of the agreement and saw it as a chance to improve 
relations with the West in the key area of military links, having Algeria lost the 
support of the Soviet Union.  
The state of economic relations was also at stake. Western investments and 
energy supplies could have been threatened.44 The FIS never clarified the specific 
economic measures it would introduce once in power. These very vague 
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commitments meant that a dangerous uncertainty regarding protection of foreign 
investments in the very lucrative gas and oil sector surrounded the FIS economic 
programme. While ‘the FIS industrial programme ends with a call for more 
involvement of the private sector, it also clearly assigns a central role to the state’45, 
particularly in key sectors of the economy. It follows that a general commitment to 
market economy did not automatically translate into further Western investments, 
protection of Western interests, or the continuation and implementation of existing 
contracts. In addition, Aliboni argues that ‘a radical regime is more easily tempted to 
set political considerations above the reality of oil transactions’46. While this point 
may be disputed, it certainly rings bells in policy-making circles. The Army would be 
able to guarantee 'economic' stability and protection much more effectively than the 
FIS.  
In addition, with the FIS in power there would have been tremendous changes 
in the personnel involved with state economic activities as the FIS had promised to 
get rid of the corrupted bureaucrats and managers working in the state sector. A 
younger generation of educated and current unemployed Arab-speaking technocrats 
supportive of FIS might have replaced them. The state apparatus was the executioner 
of military and political decisions, but was also ‘a vast network of personnel, 
bureaucrats, and public sector entrepreneurs maintaining a symbiotic relationship with 
the regime, carrying out its dictates in return for personal profit.’47 Market oriented 
reforms had given them the means for personal enrichment and corruption grew out 
of control, particularly in the oil sector. This took place to the detriment of a class of 
new technocrats who turned to FIS to channel their discontent and who, once in 
control, might have had different ideas regarding the on-going economic policies. 
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Another aspect to take into consideration is migration. A FIS government, it 
was believed, would have meant a huge influx of immigrants into Southern Europe as 
people afraid of the instauration of an Islamic Republic might have wished to leave 
the country. There was a feeling that many would flee Algeria and join relatives or 
friends in France and to a lesser extent other southern European countries. Public 
opinion in those countries would have not easily tolerated a wave of Algerian 
refugees. The French and Italian governments felt that this aspect of Mediterranean 
relations could have been better served with a strong, efficient military junta.  
James Phillips, a senior policy analyst at The Heritage Foundation in 
Washington DC, summarised briefly American interests in the area: 1) maintain 
support for Pro-Western Arab secular regimes; 2) contain international terrorism; 3) 
defend the peace process between Israel and the PLO; 4) increase non-proliferation 
efforts; 5) keep a safe access for the West to the energy resources in the area and 6) 
defend human rights.48 These interests, he argued, would have been best defended if 
the Army remained in control in Algeria.  For these reasons the West turned a blind 
eye on the dismissal of democracy in Algeria and 'favoured' the Army's coup. 
Naturally, the military intervention would not have taken place without the 
convergence of domestic interests. Key players within the FLN, the Army and the 
bureaucracy did not want the FIS in power because their privileges would have been 
endangered. Others were truly worried about the possibility of having to live in an 
Iranian-style Islamic Republic. The Army perceived the FIS as a threat to national 
unity and to the status of the Army itself within Algerian society. 
Fear of fundamentalism was probably misplaced, as a number of studies on 
the FIS do not seem to point in that direction. The FIS was more a social movement 
with religious connotations rather than a fundamentalist party with a coherent 
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political programme and ideological commitments. While Islamic traits are an 
important component of the FIS policies, these are more concerned with social issues. 
According to Hugh Roberts, ‘Algerian Islamism during this period (early 1990s) was 
never subversive or revolutionary.’49 Redistribution of wealth, end of corruption, 
equal access to state jobs, end of discrimination for non-French speakers, promotions 
in the civil service according to merit and not to connections were the pillars of the 
FIS political programme. Dissenting voices argued that FIS was not committed to 
democracy and Yahia Zoubir underlines that ‘FIS activities and the discourse of its 
main leaders revealed the aversion of the party to democratic principles.’50 Despite 
these conflicting views about the FIS nature, a campaign of demonisation of its 
leaders and policies occurred. When it became clear that the West was involved in 
this process of demonisation for its own interests, an alliance between ruling elites 
and Western governments was formed at the expenses of the FIS and of democratic 
procedures and principles. This alliance was never 'publicised' as the regime could not 
be seen to be too close to the 'old enemy', but it can be argued that close contacts at 
top level were necessary to achieve post-coup legitimacy. On the grounds of anti-
fundamentalism it would have been much easier to justify repression and the Army 
argued that ‘elections should not serve the purposes of a party that threatened 
democracy [even if] there was never a strong hint that once in power the FIS would 
violently impose Islamic law and radically change society, economy, and state.’51 In 
addition ‘most international and regional actors have vested interests in pushing away 
fundamentalists from any legitimate role in internal, regional and international 
affairs.’52 
From an analytical point of view there are two instruments to rely on if a 
causal mechanism is to be established between the failed democratisation and 
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international factors in the case of Algeria: 1) analyse the behaviour of international 
actors before the coup and 2) identify what the Algerian Army received from the West 
after their intervention. Concerning the first 'instrument' it is crucial to highlight the 
attitudes of France, the USA and the EU toward the changes taking place in Algeria in 
the 1980's and early 1990's. Franco-Algerian relations cannot be discussed in detail 
due to the complexity of such a relationship. It suffices to say that President 
Mitterrand welcomed the process of democratisation, but quickly reverted to realist 
politics when made aware that the opening up of the political process could mean an 
Islamic success. According to Martin Stone, for some time before the coup the French 
government had ‘become increasingly concerned for the security of French 
commercial interests and wanted to prevent further serious instability’53 in the 
migratory process in particular. Moreover, ‘the French government was anxious to 
discourage the creation of an Islamic state and merely paid lip-service to the idea of 
genuine political pluralism in Algeria.’54 These fears resulted in the granting of 
credits and loans on the part of international financial institutions55 and on the French 
Treasury at the end of 198956. It must be underlined that the Chadli government 
played on these French preoccupations to secure favourable financial treatment, but 
Paris was truly committed to avoid the creation of an Islamic republic in Algeria. 
Disaster-like scenarios were imagined57, where hordes of boat people would try to 
reach Europe by sea and therefore destabilise the entire Mediterranean. Finally, 
Mitterrand mildly criticised the Algerian military for their intervention in the electoral 
process, but soon after that, ‘French support for the regime became once again 
explicit.’58 
US-Algerian relationships had begun to take a positive turn in the 1980's, after 
many years of mutual distrust. Chadli's economic reforms attracted interest in the 
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United States and economic ties improved. American companies invested heavily in 
Algeria, particularly in the oil and gas sector. The US quickly became a major 
customer for Algerian gas. In the difficult transition years, the US were supportive of 
Algeria's pluralist effort, but as soon as it became clear that the FIS would become a 
potentially adversarial political actor, the policy changed. While American foreign 
policy was never openly supportive of the regime as French foreign policy until 1995, 
it was clear that Washington preferred the generals to the Islamists. Channels for 
American influence on domestic actors had been opened in 1985, as ‘the United 
States Department of Defence had provided a small annual grant under the 
International Military Education and Training Program to provide professional 
military development courses and technical training for Algerian officers in 
leadership positions or deemed to be potential leaders.’59  It is interesting to note that 
‘the White House first stated that the military intervention fell within the provisions 
of the 1989 Constitution.’60 While another statement calling for respect of 
international democratic standards was issued later, the Administration lenient stance 
on a military coup at the height of a wave of democratisations around the globe was 
very telling about US priorities in the area. For the US, ‘the only preoccupation is the 
stability of the Arab and Muslim countries without regards for who is in power’61 and 
when it became clear that the FIS would be confrontational towards the West, 
differences with France were largely tactical not strategic. 
Concerning the EU position toward Algeria, the EU countries delegated most 
of its 'foreign policy' to France. However, some EU countries were involved in 
bilateral relations with Algeria. The UK was very active in supporting its oil 
companies in Algeria and in providing the regime with new weaponry, such as two 
tank-landing ships in the early 1980s. In addition, the British undertook a joint project 
The Failed Liberalisation of Algeria 
 24 
with the Algerian navy for the delivery of twelve fast-attack crafts armed with Italian 
Otomat missiles. The Italian government was also involved in sustaining the Algerian 
government by granting credits for US $ 7b after the gas company SNAM was 
allowed to sign a lucrative contract with Sonatrach in December 1990.62  
To conclude, France, the USA, and to a lesser degree other Western countries 
had all access to key domestic actors, had interests to defend and therefore had a 
considerable impact in making Western preferences known and taken into 
consideration. As underlined by Habib Souaidia, ‘the links between the Algerian 
generals and France are numerous and old.’63  
The second instrument through which it is possible to 'measure' the 
contribution of the international dimension is the 'rewards' that have been granted to 
the Algerian regime after the coup. The overall policy of the West was certainly to 
offer economic aid and political support64. This has been largely recognised in the 
literature on Western-Algerian relations. The new government was granted complete 
legitimacy by all international institutions and Western governments. After the coup, 
Algeria was admitted to all Euro-Mediterranean partnership initiatives. There was no 
strong political condemnation, there were no talks of economic sanctions, and there 
was not much bad press as the blame for the civil war was put on FIS.65  
Secondly, France quickly supplied the regime with new weaponry, provided 
intelligence and exported the latest surveillance technology to be used against the 
Islamic movement.66 The Army's budget is difficult to quantify, but the high intensity 
of the conflict suggests that spending on weaponry increased from an already high 
figure in 1990.67 The data collected by the Stockholm Peace Research Institute show 
that military expenditure as percentage of the GDP increased constantly since 1991 
and military spending went from US $ 622m in 1991 to US $ 1,119m just two years 
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later.68 Justification for this support was also due to the 'externalisation' of the civil 
war, whereby Iran and Sudan were accused by the Algerian regime of propping up the 
Islamic groups. In turn, the West was able to argue that their support for the Algerian 
military coincided with their desire to keep international terrorism in check. Just 
recently, ‘Qatar has ordered 7.5 million dollars worth of military equipment from 
Britain as a gift for the Algerian army’69 with the full knowledge of the British 
government. In fact, Qatar Foreign Minister declared ‘the British government has no 
objection to the export of arms to Algeria.’70  
In the economic sphere, Algeria was granted a debt-rescheduling program by 
the IMF on two occasions. Lucile Provost highlights that both times ‘the rescheduling 
was obtained thanks to the intense lobbying carried out by the French authorities’71 
and the good offices of the United States. According to Martinez, both debt 
rescheduling and international aid allowed the regime to pay for the costs of its 
survival and consolidation.72 In exchange, the Algerian government accelerated the 
pace of IMF-sponsored reforms. The regime has also been supplied with agricultural 
commodities and it has benefited from a dramatic increase in foreign investments. 
American companies ‘have more than 2 billion dollars invested in the country’73 and 
French and Italian companies invested heavily as well despite terrorist threats against 
foreign citizens and the killings of many of them. The financial difficulties of the 
regime could have been exploited to pressurise those in power in accepting a 
negotiated resolution, but the regime was instead bailed out. The pressure might have 
not worked, but the simple effort would have shown ethical commitment.  
According to John Entelis, ‘France's position has been to stand back and allow 
the military government since 1992 to consolidate power,’74 while the Algerian Army 
decided to do so to polish its image and to gain international respectability. However, 
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elections exclude FIS and are rigged, as the latest presidential election 
demonstrated.75 The Algerian government pays lip-service to Arab nationalism and 
sometimes speaks against Western domination of world affairs, while negotiating and 
bargaining behind the scenes with the former colonial power on how to get rid of the 
Islamic movement and how to proceed with Algeria's economic integration in the 
world economy.  
 
Conclusion 
 It is difficult to clearly specify the causal mechanisms that link international 
variables and democratisation. However, regime changes do not take place in a 
vacuum and international factors, in the least, influence the strategies of the domestic 
actors involved. External shocks, systemic pressures and international strategic 
considerations are just as important in initiating or shattering transitions as domestic 
factors. The questions arising from the Algerian experience feed into and are evidence 
of the relevance of the international context of regime changes. In particular, the role 
of Western powers cannot be dismissed as secondary, because Western liberal 
democracies have the means and the power to influence what takes place in the rest of 
the world. Moreover, the international system constrains countries in transition in 
adopting domestic structures that favour integration in the system otherwise they may 
pay the price of exclusion. Taking international factors into account is not to obscure 
the importance of domestic factors and point simply to structural causes, but to 
integrate it in order to achieve a more comprehensive explanation.  
The negative legacy of events that took place a decade ago is still evident 
today. In January 2001 the EU granted Algeria an aid of 8 million euros to fight 
terrorism without strings attached (no mention of democratisation or respect for 
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human rights) and despite solid evidence pointing to Army’s unjustified brutality and 
repressive policies.76 The hopes of the late 1980’s for a progressive inclusion within 
the democratic camp of North African countries have been dashed, but their inclusion 
within the international economy has been achieved. A legacy of authoritarian rule is 
what we have to contend today. 
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